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ABSTRACT
Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) are high-level protocols
describing the course of action an agent should perform as
a function of its knowledge. The use of KBPs for expressing
action policies in AI planning has been surprisingly over-
looked. Given that to each KBP corresponds an equivalent
plan and vice versa, KBPs are typically more succinct than
standard plans, but imply more on-line computation time.
Here we make this argument formal, and prove that there
exists an exponential succinctness gap between knowledge-
based programs and standard plans. Then we address the
complexity of plan existence. Some results trivially follow
from results already known from the literature on planning
under incomplete knowledge, but many were unknown so
far.
1. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) [7] are high-level pro-
tocols which describe the actions an agent should perform
as a function of its knowledge, such as, typically, if Kϕ
then π else π′, where K is an epistemic modality and π,
π′ are subprograms.
Thus, in a KBP, branching conditions are epistemically
interpretable, and deduction tasks are involved at execution
time (on-line). KBPs can be seen as a powerful language
for expressing policies or plans, in the sense that epistemic
branching conditions allow for exponentially more compact
representations. In contrast, standard plans (as in contin-
gent planning) or standard policies (as in POMDPs) either
are sequential or branch on objective formulas, and hence
can be executed efficiently, but they can be exponentially
larger (see for instance [1]).
Having said this, KBPs have surprisingly been overlooked
in the perspective of planning. Initially developed for dis-
tributed computing, they have been considered in AI for
agent design [5] and game theory [10]. For planning, the
only works we know of are by Reiter [17], who gives an
implementation of KBPs in Golog; Classen and Lakemeyer
[6], who implement KBPs in a decidable fragment of the
situation calculus; Herzig et al. [9], who discuss KBPs for
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propositional planning problems, and Laverny and Lang [12,
13], who generalize KBPs to belief -based programs allowing
for uncertain action effects and noisy observations. None of
these papers really addresses computational issues.
A few papers in the AI planning literature have stud-
ied planning with incomplete knowledge where the agent’s
knowledge is represented by means of epistemic modalities,
such as Petrick and Bacchus [16]. Another recent stream
of work focuses on describing planning problems within the
framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Lo¨we et al. [14],
Bolander and Andersen [3]). Nilogy and Ramanujam [15]
also make use of epistemic logic for planning with “action
trials”, where action feedback corresponds to the action suc-
ceeding or failing. However, in all these papers, epistemic
formulas are used only for representing the current knowl-
edge state and the effects of actions, not in branching con-
ditions, which bear on observations only.
Recently, [11] have started to address the computational
issues of planning with knowledge-based programs, by iden-
tifying the complexity of plan verification under various as-
sumptions on the available constructs for plans and the avail-
able actions. Even if they briefly address the succinctness of
knowledge-based programs compared to standard plans, the
discussion remains at an informal level; moreover they do
not consider at all the plan existence problem, which is even
more important for practical planning purposes than plan
verification. This paper contributes to fill these two gaps.
We define knowledge-based programs and planning prob-
lems in Section 3. Section 4 formally relates KBPs to stan-
dard plans, by showing that both have the same expres-
sivity, but that KBPs are exponentially more succinct than
standard plans. Section 5 focuses on the plan existence prob-
lem. We could think that because KBPs and standard plans
are equally expressive, KBP existence is equivalent to stan-
dard plan existence, the complexity of which has been in-
vestigated, especially by Rintanen [18]. This is partly true,
and indeed some results about KBP existence directly fol-
low from these earlier results. This is however not true for
(a) “small” KBP existence problems, where the objective
is to find a small enough KBP allowing to reach the goal;
(b) purely epistemic plan existence, which have surprisingly
been ignored. Our main results are the following: (a) the
existence of a bounded-size solution KBP is EXPSPACE-
complete, and falls down to Σp3-complete if loops are disal-
lowed, to Σp2-complete for the restriction to ontic actions and
the restriction to epistemic actions and positive goals; (b)
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purely epistemic plan existence is PSPACE-complete, and
coNP-complete if the goal is a positive epistemic formula.
Further issues are briefly evoked in the conclusion.
2. PRELIMINARIES
A KBP is executed by an agent in an environment. We
model what the agent knows about the current state (of
the environment and internal variables) in the propositional
epistemic logic S5. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be propositional
symbols. A state is a valuation of X; e.g., x1x2 is the state
where x1 is false and x2 is true. We sometimes use the
notation x with x1 = x and x0 = x¯. A knowledge state M
for S5 is a nonempty set of states (those the agent considers
possible): at any point in time, the agent has a knowledge
state M ⊆ 2X and the current state is some s ∈ M . For
instance, M = {x1x¯2, x¯1x2} means that the agent knows x1
and x2 have different values in the current state.
Formulas of S5 are built up from X, the usual connectives,
and the knowledge modality K. An S5 formula is objective
if it does not contain any occurrence of K. Objective formu-
las are denoted by ϕ, ψ, etc. whereas general S5 formulas
are denoted by Φ, Ψ etc. For an objective formula ϕ, we
denote by Mods(ϕ) the set of all states which satisfy ϕ (i.e.,
Mods(ϕ) = {s ∈ 2X , s |= ϕ}). The size |Φ| of an S5 for-
mula Φ is the total number of occurrences of propositional
symbols, connectives and modality K in Φ. It is well-known
(see, e.g., [7]) that any S5 formula is equivalent to a formula
without nested K modalities; therefore we disallow them.
An S5 formula Φ is purely subjective if objective formulas
occur only in the scope of K, and a purely subjective S5
formula is in knowledge negative normal form (SKNNF) if
the negation symbol ¬ occurs only in objective formulas (in
the scope of K) or directly before a K modality. Note that
any purely subjective S5 formula Φ can be rewritten into
an equivalent SKNNF of polynomial size using de Morgan’s
laws. An SKNNF formula is positive if the negation sym-
bol never appears in front of a K modality. For instance,
K¬(p∧q)∨¬(Kr∨K¬r) is not in SKNNF, but is equivalent
to the SKNNF formula K¬(p ∧ q) ∨ (¬Kr ∧ ¬K¬r), which
is not a positive SKNNF, whereas K¬(p∧ q)∧ (Kr∨K¬¬r)
is a positive SKNNF.
The satisfaction of a purely subjective formulas depends
only on a knowledge stateM , not on the actual current state
(see, e.g., [7]): M satisfies an atom Kϕ, written M |= Kϕ,
if for all s ∈ M , s |= ϕ, and the semantics for combinations
of atoms with ¬,∧,∨ is defined as usual.
3. KNOWLEDGE-BASEDPROGRAMSAND
PLANNING PROBLEMS
We briefly recall the essential definitions about KBPs [11].
Given a set AO of ontic actions and a set AE of epistemic
actions, a knowledge-based program (KBP) is defined induc-
tively as follows:
• the empty plan πλ is a KBP;
• any action α ∈ AO ∪AE is a KBP;
• if π and π′ are KBPs, then π;π′ is a KBP;
• if π, π′ are KBPs and Φ is a formula in SKNNF , then
if Φ then π else π′ endif is a KBP;
• if π is a KBP and Φ is a formula in SKNNF, then
while Φ do π endwhile is a KBP.
The class of while-free KBPs is obtained by omitting the
while construct. The size |π| of a KBP π is defined to be
the number of occurrences of actions, plus the size of branch-
ing conditions, in π. Finally, we sometimes view while-free
KBPs as trees, with some nodes labelled by actions and
having one child (the KBP following this action), and some
nodes labelled by an epistemic formula and having two chil-
dren (for if constructs). Accordingly, we refer to branches
of KBPs.
Let X ′ = {x′ | x ∈ X}, denoting the values of vari-
ables after an action has been taken. An ontic action α
is represented by its theory Σα, which is a propositional for-
mula over X ∪ X ′ such that for all states s ∈ 2X , the set
{s′ ∈ 2X′ | ss′ |= Σα} is nonempty, and is exactly the set
of possible states after α is performed in s. For instance,
with X = {x1, x2}, the action α which nondeterministically
reinitializes the value of x1 has the theory Σα = (x
′
2 ↔ x2).
Observe that ontic actions are nondeterministic in general;
moreover, when taking such an action the agent does not
know which outcome occurred. We sometimes omit the
“‘frame axioms” of the form x′i ↔ xi from Σα, e.g., we write
x′1 ↔ ¬x1 for the action of switching x1, whatever the other
variables.
Now, an epistemic action α is represented by its feedback
theory Ωα, which is a list of positive epistemic atoms of the
form Ωα = (Kϕ1, . . . ,Kϕn). For instance, the epistemic
action which senses the value of an objective formula ϕ is
denoted by test(ϕ), and its feedback theory is Ωtest(ϕ) =
(Kϕ,K¬ϕ). We require that feedbacks be exhaustive (ϕ1 ∨
· · · ∨ ϕn is tautological), so that in any state an epistemic
action yields a feedback, but we do not require them to be
mutually exclusive; if several feedbacks are possible in some
state, one is chosen nondeterministically at execution time.
Operational Semantics.
The agent executing a KBP starts in some knowledge state
M0, and at any timestep t until the execution terminates, it
has a current knowledge state M t. When execution comes
to a branching condition Φ, Φ is evaluated in the current
knowledge state (i.e., the agent decides whether M t |= Φ
holds).
The knowledge state M t is defined inductively as the pro-
gression of M t−1 by the action executed between t − 1
and t. Formally, given a knowledge state M ⊆ 2X and
an ontic action α, the progression of M by α is defined
to be Prog(M,α) = M ′ ⊆ 2X′ defined by M ′ = {s′ ∈
2X
′ | s ∈ M, ss′ |= Σα}. Now given an epistemic action
α, a knowledge state M , and a feedback Kϕi ∈ Ωα with
M |= K¬ϕi, the progression of M by Kϕi is defined to be
Prog(M,Kϕi) = {s ∈ M | s |= ϕi}. The progression is
undefined when M |= K¬ϕi.
Example 1. Consider a system composed of three com-
ponents; for each i = 1, 2, 3, we have a propositional symbol
ok i meaning that component i is in working order, an action
repair(i) that makes ok i true, and an action test(i) that re-
turns the truth value of ok i; for instance, Σrepair(1) = ok
′
1 ∧
(ok ′2 ↔ ok2) ∧ (ok ′3 ↔ ok3) and Ωtest(1) = (Kok1,K¬ok1).
Let π = π1;π2;π3, where πi is defined as
if ¬(Kok i ∨K¬ok i) then test(i) endif ;
if K¬ok i then repair(i) endif
With M0 = Mods((ok1 ↔ (ok2 ∧ ok3)) ∧ (¬ok2 ∨ ¬ok3)),
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Prog(M0, repair(1)) is M1 = Mods(ok1 ∧ (¬ok2 ∨ ¬ok3)),
Prog(M1,Kok2) is M
2 = Mods(ok1 ∧ ok2 ∧ ¬ok3)), and
Prog(M2, repair(3)) is M3 = Mods(ok1 ∧ ok2 ∧ ok3).
Finally, a trace τ of a KBP π in a knowledge state M0
is a sequence of knowledge states, either infinite, i.e., τ =
(M i)i≥0, or finite, i.e., τ = (M0,M1, . . . ,MT ), which cor-
responds to the iterated progression of M0 by the actions in
π, given an outcome s ∈ 2X (resp. a feedback Kϕ) for each
ontic (resp. epistemic) action encountered. We say that two
KBPs π and π′ are equivalent (resp. equivalent in M0) if
they have exactly the same traces in any initial knowledge
state (resp. in M0).
KBPs as Plans.
We define a knowledge-based planning problem P to be
a tuple (I, AO, AE , G), where I = Mods(ϕ
0) is the initial
knowledge state, G is an SKNNF S5 formula called the goal,
and AO (resp. AE) is a set of ontic (resp. epistemic) actions
together with their theories. Then a KBP π (using actions
in AO ∪AE) is said to be a (valid) plan for P if all its traces
in I are finite, and for all traces (M0, . . . ,MT ) of π with
M0 = I, MT |= G holds.
Interesting restrictions of knowledge-based planning prob-
lems are obtained either by restricting the form of KBPs (by
disallowing loops, or by bounding the size of the KBP), by
restricting the set of actions allowed (by requiring all actions
to be ontic or all actions to be epistemic), or by adding a re-
striction on the goal (by requiring it to be a positive KNNF).
The restriction to positive goals deserves some comments.
After all, one may think that goals should always be pos-
itive – and in most of practical cases they will indeed be:
why should a robot care about not knowing something? The
more it knows, the easier it is to make accurate decisions.
This is true in a single-agent environment. Now, even if our
paper does not address full multi-agent environments (which
are much more complex to handle), it allows to represent at
least a simple class of multi-agent planning problems, where
only one agent is able to act but other agents observe its
actions and feedbacks. But there might be facts which the
acting agent wants to avoid the other to learn, and under
the assumption that observations are considered as public
announcements, the acting agent will also want not to learn
these facts1.
4. SUCCINCTNESS
So as to measure the benefit of using KBPs as plans, we
compare them to what we call standard policies. We define
such policies exactly as KBPs, but allowing branching on
feedbacks just obtained via an epistemic action, rather than
on unrestricted epistemic formulas. What we have in mind
here is to compare KBPs to reactive policies, for which the
next action to take can be found efficiently at execution time.
Definition 1 (standard policy). A standard policy
is a KBP in which the last action executed before any branch-
ing if Φ or while Φ is an epistemic action a such that Φ
is some Kϕi ∈ Ωa.
1The reader has certainly experienced the situation where
the screen of her laptop, connected to a videoprojector, ap-
pears on a screen in front of everyone and each of her actions
(reading email, inspecting the contents of a directory. . . )
could possibly reveal some information she does not want
everyone to see.
Hence evaluating a branching condition of a standard pol-
icy at execution time only requires to compare the feed-
back just obtained to the branching condition Φ. Particular
cases of standard policies are policies for partially observable
Markov decision processes (POMDPs), which alternate the
following steps: (i) taking an (ontic) action, (ii) receiving an
observation about the current state, and (iii) branching on
the observation received. Observe however that our defini-
tion is more general, in that the alternation between decision
and observation+branching steps is unrestricted, and that
loops are allowed. For instance, our definition also encom-
passes sequential plans (of the form a1; a2; . . . ; an), but also
controllers with finite memory [4].
Clearly, for every initial knowledge state MO and every
KBP π, there is a standard policy equivalent to π in M0.
Such a policy can be obtained by simulating all possible ex-
ecutions of π in M0 and, for each one, evaluating all (epis-
temic) branching conditions. We only give an example here
(a formal definition is given in the Appendix—Definition 4
and Proposition 11).
Example 2. The standard policy associated with π and
M0 in Example 1 is the following:
repair(1); test(2);
if K¬ok2 then
repair(2);
test(3);
if K¬ok3 then repair(3) endif
else repair(3)
endif
Such translations are of course not guaranteed to be poly-
nomial, which raises the issue whether KBPs are more suc-
cinct than standard policies. We first give a formal definition
of succinctness.
Definition 2 (succinctness). Let C = (Cn)n∈N be a
class of KBPs (or standard policies), and let P = (Pn)n∈N be
a family of planning problems. Then C is said to be succinct
for P if there is a polynomial p : N → N and a family (πn)n∈N
of KBPs satisfying πn ∈ Cn, |πn| ∈ O(p(n)), and such that
πn is a valid plan for Pn.
A class C is said to be as succinct as a class C′ if for all
families P of planning problems such that C′ is succinct for
P, C is also succinct for P. It is said to be more succinct
than C′ if in addition, there is a family P of planning prob-
lems for which C is succinct but C′ is not.
Note that our definition of being more succinct is quite
demanding, since not only it requires that there is no poly-
size KBP in C′ equivalent to π ∈ C, but also it requires that
there is no polysize KBP which is valid for the same problem
(may it be nonequivalent to π).
Clearly, because standard policies are defined as particular
cases of KBPs, the latter are always at least as succinct than
the former. We now show that KBPs are more succinct than
standard policies, even under several restrictions.
Proposition 1. If NP ⊆ P/poly holds, while-free KBPs
with atomic epistemic branching conditions are more suc-
cinct than while-free standard policies.
Proof. For all n ∈ N, we exhibit a KBP πn as in the
claim which essentially reads a 3CNF formula over n vari-
ables (hidden in the initial state), and either makes sure that
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it is unsatisfiable, or builds a model. This KBP has size
polynomial in n. Now assume there is a while-free standard
policy π′ of size polynomial in |π|, and hence in n, which
is a valid plan for the same problem. Then because stan-
dard policies can be executed with constant-time delay and
because π′ is while-free, execution of π′ would be a (pos-
sibly nonuniform) polytime algorithm for 3SAT, yielding
3SAT ∈ P/poly and hence, NP ⊆ P/poly. The construction
of the KBP πn and the definition of the knowledge-based
planning problem Pn are detailed in the Appendix (Propo-
sition 12).
Observe that the proof even shows that there are plan-
ning problems with succinct while-free KBPs (with atomic
branching conditions) but with no compact while-free plan
with polynomial-delay execution (cf. the notion of a compact
sequential-access representation [1]). Observe however that
if loops are allowed, then there does exist a compact stan-
dard policy for the 3SAT problem (for instance, the DPLL
algorithm). However, it turns out that there are problems
with succinct KBPs (with loops) but with no succinct stan-
dard policy at all (even with loops).
Proposition 2. KBPs are more succinct than standard
policies.
Proof. There is a KBP π of size polynomial in n (in
particular, manipulating a number of variables polynomial
in n) with exactly one trace in some precise initial knowl-
edge state M0, of size 22
n − 1 [11, Proposition 5]. Now
Proposition 13 in the Appendix shows that given a KBP π,
a planning problem P can be built efficiently, for which all
valid plans are equivalent to π in M0 (up to a polynomial
number of void actions), and for which π is indeed valid.
Towards a contradition, assume that there is a valid stan-
dard policy π′ for P . Then π′ has exactly one trace, of size
22
n − 1 (up to a polynomial). But if π′ has size polyno-
mial in n, then it can manipulate at most n variables, and
because it is a standard policy it can be in at most 2n|π′| dif-
ferent configurations (values of variables plus control point).
Hence it cannot have a terminating trace of length greater
than 2n|π|, a contradiction.
We conclude this section by considering the succintness gap
induced by loops in KBPs.
Proposition 3. KBPs are more succinct than while-free
KBPs.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that for each
KBP π, there is an equivalent while-free KBP π′ satisfy-
ing |π′| ≤ p(|π|). Then there is an algorithm showing that
verifying a KBP (with loops) is a problem in ΣP3 (Propo-
sition 14 in the Appendix). Since on the other hand we
know that verifying an unrestricted KBP is an EXPSPACE-
hard problem [11, Proposition 6], we get a contradiction
with ΣP3 ⊆ PSPACE  EXPSPACE (Savitch’s theorem). Fi-
nally, given a polynomial-size KBP π for which there is no
equivalent polynomial-size while-free KBP, we build a prob-
lem which has only π and equivalent KBPs as valid plans
(Proposition 13 in the Appendix), and this problem shows
that KBPs are more succinct than while-free KBPs.
5. COMPLEXITY OF PLAN EXISTENCE
We now consider the problem of deciding whether there
exists a valid KBP for a given planning problem. Since the
main benefit of using KBPs is to get succinct (and read-
able) plans, we insist on the “small KBP existence” prob-
lem, where we ask whether there exists a valid KBP within
a given size bound.
Definition 3 (existence). The plan existence prob-
lem takes as input a knowledge-based planning problem P =
(I, AO, AE , G) and asks whether there exists a valid KBP π
for P . The bounded size plan existence problem takes as in-
put a knowledge-based planning problem P = (I, AO, AE , G)
and an integer k encoded in unary, and asks whether there
exists a KBP π for P satisfying |π| ≤ k.
We start with the complexity of plan existence, that is,
without a size bound.
Proposition 4. Plan existence is 2-EXPTIME-complete.
It is EXPSPACE-complete if only ontic actions are allowed.
Proof. The first two results follow from the fact that
there is a valid KBP for a given knowledge-based planning
problem P if and only if there is a valid standard policy for
P (Proposition 11 in the Appendix), together with known
results by Rintanen [18] and by Haslum and Jonsson [8].
Proposition 5. While-free KBP existence restricted to
epistemic actions is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. WriteWFE-Existence for the problem of while-
free KBP existence. We introduce a variant, called WFOE-
Existence (for “While-Free Ordered Epistemic”), in which
a total order < on AE is given as an additional input, and
the question is whether there is a valid KBP for P , in which
actions occur in the order < in any execution. Then we show
QBF ≤P WFOE-Existence ≤P WFE-Existence.
The reductions are given in the Appendix (Propositions 17
and 18). Because QBF is PSPACE-complete, it follows that
WFE-Existence is PSPACE-hard. Finally, because only
epistemic actions are available, the state never changes, and
hence executing the same epistemic action twice in an execu-
tion is useless. It follows that we are essentially searching for
a tree of height at most |AE |, and membership in PSPACE
easily follows.
Proposition 6. While-free KBP existence restricted to
epistemic actions and positive goals is coNP-complete.
Proof. This proof is essentially by a reduction to validity
in S5 (Proposition 16 in the Appendix).
Proposition 7. Bounded KBP existence is EXPSPACE-
complete.
Proof. For hardness, we reduce the problem of verify-
ing that a KBP π is valid for a planning problem P =
(I, AO, AE , G) to plan existence, by building a planning
problem P ′ with bound k = |π| for which π is valid if and
only if it is valid for P , and every valid plan is equivalent
to π. For this we use Proposition 13 with the construction
initialized with I and G. Hence if π is valid for P , then P ′
has a plan of size at most k (namely, π), and if π is not valid
for P , then P ′ has no valid plan. Because verification is an
EXPSPACE-hard problem [11, Proposition 6], we get hard-
ness. Membership follows from the fact that a plan π can be
guessed, that verifying that it is valid is in EXPSPACE [11,
Proposition 6 again], and from NEXPSPACE = EXPSPACE
(Savitch’s theorem).
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Proposition 8. While-free bounded KBP existence is Σp3-
complete. Hardness holds even if the goal is restricted to be
a positive epistemic formula.
Proof. Since solutions have bounded size, membership
in ΣP3 follows from the fact that while-free KBP verification
is in Πp2 [11, Proposition 2]. For hardness, we give a reduc-
tion from QBF3,∃ (Proposition 19 in the Appendix).
Proposition 9. While-free bounded KBP existence re-
stricted to ontic actions is ΣP2-complete.
Proof. Because there is no feedback, there is no need
for branching, therefore there is a plan of size at most k
if and only if there is a valid plan which is a sequence of
at most k actions. The bounded KBP existence problem is
therefore equivalent to the bounded plan existence problem,
which is known to be ΣP2-complete [2] if the goal is positive
atomic. Now membership in ΣP2 in the general case follows
from the fact that verifying a plan can be done by comput-
ing the memoryful progression [11] in polynomial time, then
checking that it entails the goal using a coNP-oracle.
As for purely epistemic planning problems, things are easy
only in the case of positive goals.
Proposition 10. While-free bounded KBP existence re-
stricted to epistemic actions and to positive goals is ΣP2-
complete.
Proof. Since the goal Γ is positive epistemic and the
state cannot change, executing more epistemic actions can-
not render a valid plan invalid. In particular, removing all
branching conditions and linearizing a valid plan gives a
valid plan. Hence there is a valid plan of size ≤ k if and
only if there is a sequence of k epistemic actions which is
a valid plan. Hence the problem can be solved by guess-
ing a plan a1; . . . ; ak and checking
∧k
i=1(
∨
Kϕj∈Ωai
ϕj) |= Γ,
which can be done by a call to a coNP-oracle. Now for hard-
ness, we give a reduction from QBF2,∃ (Proposition 20 in
the Appendix).
6. CONCLUSION
Our contributions are twofold. First, we have made formal
the succinctness gap obtained by the possibility to branch on
complex epistemic formulas instead of simply branching on
observations. Second, we have obtained several nontrivial
results on the complexity of KBP existence for a planning
problem. The results are synthesized in the table below.
Note that as far as unbounded KBP existence is concerned,
whether loops are allowed or not does not make a difference:
since valid plans are required to stop, every valid KBP with
loops can be rewritten into an equivalent while-free KBP.
This remark helps us having all cells of the left column filled.
unbounded bounded
general 2-EXPTIME-c. EXPSPACE-c.
while-free (wf) 2-EXPTIME-c. Σp3-c.
ontic EXPSPACE-c. ?
wf, ontic EXPSPACE-c. Σp2-c.
wf, epistemic PSPACE-c. ?
wf, epist.+pos. goals coNP-c. Σp2-c.
We do not know the complexity of KBP existence for
while-free epistemic actions and arbitrary (not necessarily
positive) goals (we only know that it is Σp2-hard, and in Σ
p
3).
Neither do we know the complexity of bounded plan exis-
tence with ontic actions and loops (other than membership
in EXPSPACE).
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APPENDIX
A. SUCCINCTNESS
Definition 4. Let π be a KBP and M0 be an initial
knowledge state. The standard policy f(π,M0) induced by
π and M0 is defined inductively as follows:
• if π is the empty KBP, then f(π,M0) is the empty
standard policy,
• if π is α;π′ for an ontic action α ∈ AO, then f(π,M0)
is α; f(π′,Prog(M0, α)),
• if π is α;π′ for an epistemic action α ∈ AE, then
f(π,M0) is
α;
if Kϕ1 then f(π
′,Prog(M0,Kϕ1))
else if Kϕ2 then f(π
′,Prog(M0,Kϕ2))
else . . .
endif
with {Kϕ1,Kϕ2, . . . } = Ωα,
• if π is if Φ then π1 else π2 endif ;π′, then (i) if M0 |=
Φ holds then f(π,M0) is f(π1;π
′,M0), and (ii) other-
wise ( i.e., M0 |= Φ) f(π,M0) is f(π2;π′,M0),
• if π is while Φ do π1 endwhile ;π′, then (i) if M0 |=
Φ holds then f(π,M0) is f(π1;π,M
0), and (ii) other-
wise ( i.e., M0 |= Φ) f(π,M0) is f(π′,M0).
Proposition 11. Let π be a KBP and M0 be an initial
knowledge state. Then π and the standard policy f(π,M0)
are equivalent in M0.
Proof. It is easily shown by induction on the structure
of π that for every possible outcome (resp. feedback) of
an ontic (resp. epistemic) action taken in π, the iterated
progression of M0 by π or f(π,M0) are the same.
Proposition 12. There is a family of planning problems
P = (Pn)n∈N for which there is a succinct family of while-
free KBPs (πn)n∈N, and any family of KBPs for P is a (pos-
sibly nonuniform) family of algorithms for 3SAT.
Proof. Let n ∈ N, implicitly defining a set of n Boolean
variables and the SAT problem for 3CNF formulas over n
variables. The variables and actions involved in the con-
struction of πn are the following:
• n unobservable Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn, intuitively
storing an assignment x to the variables of a 3CNF
formula (this assignment is arbitrary and unknown to
the agent),
• O(n3 × 3 log n) Boolean variables i,j,k (i = 1, . . . , n3,
j = 1, 2, 3, k = 1, . . . , log n), intuitively encoding a
3CNF formula ϕ (i,j,k represents the kth bit of the
encoding of the literal in position j in the ith clause) ;
the value of these variables, i.e., the 3CNF formula, is
arbitrary, but can be “read” by a KBP through epis-
temic actions test(i,j,k),
• an unobservable variable s (“satisfied”) which is neces-
sarily false if x does not satisfy ϕ ; to model this, the
initial knowledge state is defined to be
M0n =
∧
i=1,...,n3
¬χi → ¬s
where χi is true if and only if x satisfies the ith clause
of ϕ (that is, χi is
∨
x∈{x1,...,xn
(
(x ∧
∨
j
i,j = x) ∨ (x¯ ∧
∨
j
i,j = x¯)
)
where i,j = x is appropriately encoded over the “bits”
i,j,k),
• ontic actions x+i and x−i , for i = 1, . . . , n, setting xi to
1 or 0, respectively.
The goal Gn of the planning problem Pn is either to know
that s is false (Ks¯) or to know that x is a model of ϕ
(K(x |= ϕ), expressed using a formula using the variables χi
as above).
We claim that the KBP πn defined as follows is a valid
plan for Pn:
test(1,1,1); test(1,1,2); . . . ; test(n3,3,logn);
if Ks¯ then stop
else
if K¬(ϕ ∧ x1) then x−1 else x+1 endif
. . .
if K¬(ϕ ∧ xn) then x−n else x+n endif
where K¬(ϕ∧xi) is a shorthand for K¬(χ1∧· · ·∧χn3 ∧xi).
Indeed, because the value of s cannot change during the
execution, s is guaranteed to be false if and only if the (ar-
bitrary) initial assignment x does not satisfy ϕ. Because
the initial value of x cannot be observed, this is true if and
only if ϕ is unsatisfiable. Otherwise, by definition an assign-
ment to x can be built which satisfies ϕ. Finally, Pn encodes
3SAT for formulas of n variables, and πn is a valid plan for
it.
Proposition 13. Given a KBP π and an initial knowlege
state M0, one can build a knowledge-based planning problem
P = (I, AO, AE , G) in time polynomial in |π|, so that π is
valid for P and all KBPs which are valid for P are equivalent
to π (up to additional variables in P and to a polynomial
number of void actions).
Proof. Using a polynomial number of void actions (with
theory Σ =
∧
x∈X x
′ ↔ x for ontic actions and Ω = {K}
for epistemic actions), we first normalize π so that it starts
with an ontic action, then epistemic and ontic actions al-
ternate, and finally that only ontic actions occur right be-
fore and right after any occurrence of if Φ then , else ,
endif , while Φ do , and endwhile . By duplicating ac-
tions, we also ensure that any action is used at most once in
π; for example, we duplicate a to a1, a2, a3, with Σai = Σa,
for the first, second, and third occurrences of a in π. All
these steps can clearly be performed in polynomial time.
We now describe how I, AO, AE , and G are computed
from π. The constructions are performed iteratively, start-
ing with I = M0, AO (resp. AE) being the set of ontic (resp.
epistemic) actions occurring in π, and G = K.
We describe in details how to handle the case when π is
a sequence of actions. Handling of branching and loops will
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be described more briefly, but relies on the same techniques.
So let π = a1; . . . ; ak with a1, a3, . . . being ontic actions and
a2, a4, . . . being epistemic actions.
We first introduce two fresh variables, ok and s, and re-
place I with I ∧Kok and G with G ∧Kok ∧ ¬(Ks ∨Ks¯).
Intuitively, ok is known to be true at the beginning and
must be known to be true at the end, but taking any ontic
action at another moment than π does will assign it to false
as a side-effect. Now the value of s (standing for “secret”) is
not known initially and must not be known at the end, but
taking any epistemic action at another moment than π does
will reveal its value.
Now for each sequence of actions ai; ai+1; ai+2 in π, where
ai, ai+2 are ontic and ai+1 is epistemic, we introduce two
fresh variables, ri+1 (standing for “ready” to execute ai+1)
and pi+2. Intuitively, ai will assign ri+1 to 1, and ai+1 will
reveal the value of pi+2 (only in case ri+1 is known to be
true). Then ai+2 is duplicated into two actions, exactly one
of which has to be chosen, depending on the value of pi+2.
In this manner, we force ai+2 to occur only after a sequence
ai; ai+1 in any valid plan.
More precisely, in AO and AE we:
• replace Σai with Σai ∧ r′i+1,
• replace Ωai+1 with {K(ϕ ∧ ri+1 → pi+2),K(ϕ ∧ r¯i+1) |
Kϕ ∈ Ωai+1 , 
 = 0, 1},
• replace ai+2 with two ontic actions, namely api+2 and
ap¯i+2 defined by{
Σapi+2
= Σai+2 ∧ (ok ′ ↔ ok ∧ pi+2) ∧ r¯′i+2
Σap¯i+2
= Σai+2 ∧ (ok ′ ↔ ok ∧ p¯i+2) ∧ r¯′i+2
and make them reinitialize pi+2, that is, the frame ax-
iom p′i+2 ↔ pi+2 is not in Σapi+2 ,Σap¯i+2 .
Note that because the process is iterated, the first transfor-
mation is in fact applied to Σapi
and Σap¯i
.
Moreover, for any other epistemic action a = ai+1, we
• replace Ωa with {K(ϕ ∧ (ri+1 → s)) | Kϕ ∈ Ωa, 
 =
0, 1} or, in the general case where this transformation
has already been performed for ri1 , . . . , rik , we replace
it with
{K(ϕ∧(ri1 ∨· · ·∨rik ∨ri+1) → s) | Kϕ ∈ Ωa, 
 = 0, 1}
Finally, for handling the last action we introduce a fresh
variable stop, and we replace I with I ∧ stop, G with G ∧
Kstop, Σak with Σak ∧ stop′, we replace ok ′ ↔ ok ∧ pi with
ok ′ ↔ ok ∧ pi ∧ stop in all other (ontic) action theories, and
duplicate each feedback Kω in other action theories into
K(ω ∧ (stop → s)), 
 = 0, 1. For handling the first action,
we replace I with I ∧Kr1, add r¯1 to σa1 , and add feedbacks
Kr1 → s, 
 = 0, 1, to all epistemic actions.
We now claim that P as defined above has (a plan equiv-
alent to) π as a valid plan, and that any other valid plan for
it is equivalent to π (in both cases, up to void actions and
additional variables).
As regards validity of π, consider the plan π′ obtained
from π by replacing all subsequences ai; ai+1; ai+2 with
ai; ai+1; if Kpi+2 then a
p
i+2 else a
p¯
i+2 endif
Then clearly, when execution comes to ai+1, ri+1 is true (and
known to be so), hence one of the feedbacks K(ri+1 → pi+2)
is obtained, revealing the truth value of pi+2. Hence a
p
i+2
or ap¯i+2 is correctly chosen for preserving achievement of the
goal Kok . Moreover, because for all j < i, the value of
rj has been reinitialized by action aj , the feedback of ai+1
gives no clue about the value of s (through K(rj → s)),
preserving the goal ¬(Ks ∨Ks¯).
Now let π′ be any plan which is valid for P , and consider
a fixed sequence of outcomes for ontic actions and feedbacks
for epistemic actions, with the aim of showing that π′ takes
(up to void actions) the same actions as π, in the same order.
The proof works by induction.
First assume that π′ takes an ontic action ai = a1 as
its first action. Then because of the effect ok ′ → ri and
since the value of ri is not known in the initial state I,
the goal Kok is not preserved. Since no action allows to
set it back, this is a contradiction with the validity of π′.
Now assume that π′ takes an epistemic action ai as its first
action. Then because r1 is true in the initial state, ai reveals
the value of s, a contradiction again since this value cannot
change along the execution. Moreover, by construction the
knowledge state resulting from taking a1 satisfies Kr¯1 and
Kr2, no variable ri (i = 2) is known to be true in it, and
the value of no variable pi is known.
We now consider the second action taken by π′. Because
r1 is false this cannot be a1, and because the value of pi
is known for no i, this cannot be api nor a
p¯
i , for any ontic
action ai. Hence this is an epistemic action, but because r2
is true this can only be a2 (otherwise the value of s would
be revealed). Now by construction, the resulting knowledge
state satisfies Kr¯1 and Kr2, no variable ri (i = 2) is known
to be true in it, the value of p3 is known in it, and finally
the value of no other pi is known.
Finally consider the third action taken by π′. Taking any
ontic action other than ap3 or a
p¯
3 would result in a blind choice
of api or a
p¯
i since the value of pi (i = 3) is not known. Now
taking an epistemic action other than a2 would reveal the
value of s (since r2 is known to be true). Finally, either π
′
takes a2 again, which amounts to a void action, or it takes
a3. Now by construction, after a3 is taken the knowledge
state satisfies Kr4, no variable ri (i = 4) is known to be
true (since a3 assigns r3 to false), and the value of no pi is
known (since a3 reinitializes p3). Hence we are in the same
situation as after the first action has been taken, and the
induction goes on, which concludes for KBPs π which are
simple sequences of actions.
We now briefly show how to handle subprograms of the
form
a; if Kϕ then b; . . . else c; . . . endif ; . . .
We introduce a new fluent, f (“forbidden”), and add ¬Kf to
the initial knowledge state and to the goal. Recall that due
to the normalization step, actions a, b, c are all ontic. Then
we
• replace Σa with Σa ∧ r′b,c,
• replace Σb with Σb ∧ ok ′ ↔ (ok ∧ rb,c ∧ ϕ) ∧ r¯′b,c,
• replace Σc with Σc∧ok ′ ↔ (ok∧rb,c∧(f ′ ↔ f∨ϕ))∧r¯′b,c.
and as in the case of sequences, we add feedbacks to all epis-
temic actions, so that they reveal the value of s if executed
when rb,c is known to be true. The construction ensures that
executing b while Kϕ is not true results in ¬Kok , hence vio-
lating the goal, and that executing c while Kϕ is true results
in Kf , again violating the goal.
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Finally, subprograms of the form
while Kϕ do a; . . . ; b endwhile ; c
are handled exactly as if they were
if Kϕ then (a; . . . ; b; if Kϕ then a else c) else c;
The fact that the two occurrences of a refer to exactly the
same action simulate a “goto” construct and hence, ensure
that a valid plan loops when necessary.
Proposition 14. If while-free KBPs are as succinct as
KBPs (with loops), then verifying a KBP with loops is a
problem in ΣP3 .
Proof. Let p be a polynomial such that for all KBPs π,
there is an equivalent while-free KBP π′ satisfying |π′| ≤
p(|π|). Then given a KBP π and a planning problem P ,
verifying that π is valid for P can be done by the following
algorithm, which essentially guesses an equivalent while-free
π′ and verifies it instead of directly verifying π:
1. guess a while-free KBP π′ of size at most p(|π|),
2. check that π′ and π are equivalent; the complement can
be decided as follows:
(a) guess a trace τ of size |π′| and the corresponding
sequence of outcomes of ontic actions and feedbacks
of epistemic actions,
(b) from the outcomes and feedbacks, compute the cor-
responding trace of π,
(c) check that at some point, π and π′ are not in the
same knowledge state,
3. verify that π′ is valid for P .
The traces in Item 2 can be represented in space polynomial
in |π′| using memoryful progression [11]. Checking that π
and π′ are in different knowledge states at some point can
be done by verifying that their memoryful progressions are
not equivalent over the variables of this timepoint, which is
a problem in ΣP2(guess a disagreeing assignment and check
that it can be extended to a model of one progression but
none of the other).
Finally, Item 2 can be solved by a call to a ΣP2-oracle.
Moreover, verifying a while-free KBP (Item 3) is a problem
in Πp2 [11, Proposition 2]. Finally, we get a nondeterminis-
tic algorithm using a ΣP2-oracle (or a Π
p
2-oracle), hence the
whole problem is in ΣP3 .
B. PLAN EXISTENCE
Proposition 15. Plan existence is ΣP2-hard if only epis-
temic actions are allowed.
Proof. We give a reduction from QBF2,∃. Let
∀a1 . . . an∃b1 . . . ∃bpϕ
be a QBF formula. We define an epistemic planning problem
P = (I, ∅, AE , G) by:
• I = K,
• AE = {test(a1), . . . , test(an)},
• G = ¬K¬ϕ ∧∧ni=1(Kai ∨Ka¯i).
Clearly, any valid plan for P must perform all actions in
all branches, since test(ai) is the only action revealing the
value of ai. Hence, there is a valid plan for P if and only if
performing all actions in sequence constitutes a valid plan
π. Now this KBP π is valid for P if and o nly if for every
a ∈ 2{a1,...,an}, it holds Ka |= ¬K¬ϕ, that is, for every
a ∈ 2{a1,...,an}, there is a b ∈ 2{b1,...,bp} with ab |= ϕ.
Proposition 16. Plan existence is coNP-complete if only
epistemic actions are allowed and the goal is restricted to be
a positive epistemic formula.
Proof. We first show membership. Because the goal
is positive, it is easy to see that adding epistemic actions
cannot render a valid plan invalid, and hence the problem
amounts to deciding whether performing all actions in se-
quence constitutes a valid plan π. Because there are no on-
tic actions, and hence the state never changes, this amounts
to checking that the formula
∧
a∈AE (
∨
Kϕi∈Ωa ϕi) entails
G. We conclude by observing that this formula has size
polynomial in |AE | and that the entailment test is one in
propositional logic, hence in coNP.
Hardness follows from the following reduction from Un-
satisfiability: a propositional formula ϕ is unsatisfiable
if and only if the planning problem with no action, initial
knowledge state K and goal K¬ϕ has a plan.
Proposition 17. There is a polynomial-time reduction
from QBF to WFOE-Existence.
Proof. Let ψ = ∃a1∀b1 . . . ∃ak∀bkϕ be a QBF, where
a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk are Boolean variables (restricting
the quantifiers to scope over only one variable is without loss
of generality, since any QBF can be rewritten in this manner
by introducing dummy variables). We define the following
instance P = (I, ∅, AE , G,<) of WFOE-Existence, where
intuitively ai (resp. a¯i) is encoded by “revealing the value
of xi” (resp. “not revealing the value of xi”), and bi (resp.
b¯i) is encoded by “yi is (known to be) true” (resp. false):
• I = K,
• AE = {test(xi) | i = 1, . . . , k}∪{test(yi) | i = 1, . . . , k},
• G = ϕ with
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ai replaced with Kxi ∨Kx¯i
a¯i replaced with ¬Kxi ∧ ¬Kx¯i
bi replaced with Kyi
b¯i replaced with Ky¯i
,
• < is (test(x1), test(y1), test(x2), . . . , test(xk), test(yk)).
Assume first that there is a strategy σ witnessing the validity
of ψ, and build a KBP π from σ by:
• replacing any decision node ai ← 1 with the action
test(xi),
• replacing any decision node ai ← 0 with the empty
KBP,
• replacing any branching node on bi with 1-child σ1 and
0-child σ0 with the KBP
test(yi); if Kyi then π1 else π0 endif
where π1 (resp. π0) is obtained recursively from σ1
(resp. σ0).
Clearly, the order of actions in π follows <. Now by con-
struction, test(xi) (resp. test(yi)) is the only action reveal-
ing the value of xi (resp. yi), and validity of π for P follows.
Conversely, let π be a KBP for P , and let πN be its nor-
malized, equivalent KBP, obtained by
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• removing all nonatomic branching conditions, e.g., by
replacing a test if Φ∧Ψ then . . . endif with the test
if Φ then if Ψ then . . . endif ,
• replacing each negative atomic branching condition of
the form ¬K withK¯ if it has test() as an ancestor on
its branch, and with K otherwise (then simplifying),
• removing any occurrence of test() which has test() as
its parent,
• pushing up any test, e.g., if K, right after the ac-
tion test() on the same branch, and reorganizing the
KBP as necessary (since we are not concerned with size
bounds, it does not matter if this incurs an explosion
in size).
Then define a strategy σ from πN by
• replacing test(xi) with a decision node ai ← 1,
• ignoring actions test(yi),
• replacing if Kxi then π1 else π0 endif with σ1 or
with σ0, arbitrarily, where σ1 (resp. σ0) is obtained
recursively from π1 (resp. π0),
• replacing if Kyi then π1 else π0 endif with a branch-
ing node on bi, with 1-child σ1 and 0-child σ0.
Clearly, σ witnesses the validity of the QBF ψ. Why σ1 or
σ0 can be chosen arbitrarily in the third item is because xi
and x¯i play a symmetric role in P .
Proposition 18. There is a polynomial-time reduction
from WFOE-Existence to WFE-Existence.
Proof. Let P = (I, ∅, AE , G,<) be an instance of WFOE-
Existence, and write AE = {a1, . . . , an} with ai < ai+1 for
all i. We define an instance P ′ = (I ′, ∅, A′E , G′) which forces
the actions to occur in order in any valid plan. To do so,
for each action ai ∈ AE we essentially (i) duplicate ai into
two actions, api and a
n
i , and (ii) modify the feedback of ai−1
such that it reveals the value of an otherwise hidden variable
pi−1. Then we modify the goal G so that a
p
i must be taken
if ai−1 yielded Kpi−1, and ani must be taken if ai−1 yielded
Kp¯i−1 (“p” stands for “positive” and “n” for “negative”). In
this manner, a valid plan must execute ai−1 before ai, for
otherwise it cannot choose between api and a
n
i .
More precisely, for each action ai ∈ AE we introduce two
fresh variables, pi and ni, and four more, μ
p
i , μ
n
i , μ
p¯
i , μ
n¯
i ,
which act as mutexes between the “twin” actions api and
ani . Then we define the following actions:
• api , representing the action to take when ai−1 yielded
Kpi−1 or Kn¯i−1, with feedback theory Ωapi = {K(ϕ ∧
pδi ∧ (μpi )) | Kϕ ∈ Ωai , δ, 
 = 0, 1},
• ani (dually), with feedback theory Ωani = {K(ϕ ∧ nδi ∧
(μni )
) | Kϕ ∈ Ωai , δ, 
 = 0, 1},
• ap¯i , representing the “pass” action when ai−1 yielded
Kpi−1 or Kn¯i−1, with feedback theory Ωap¯i
= {K(pδi ∧
(μp¯i )
) | δ, 
 = 0, 1},
• an¯i , with feedback theory Ωan¯i = {K(n
δ
i ∧ (μn¯i )) | δ, 
 =
0, 1}.
We define A′E to be {api , ani , ap¯i , an¯i | i = 1, . . . , n}, and we
define the goal G′ to be:
G∧
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∧n
i=2 (Kpi−1 ∨Kn¯i−1) → (Kpi ∨Kp¯i)∧ ∧ni=2 (Kp¯i−1 ∨Kni−1) → (Kni ∨Kn¯i)
∧ ∧ i=1,...,n
a,b∈{p,n,p¯,n¯}
a =b
(¬Kμai ∧ ¬Kμ¯ai ) ∨ (¬Kμbi ∧ ¬Kμ¯bi )
Finally, we define I ′ = I, and we show that there is a valid
KBP π for P if and only if there is a valid KBP π′ for P ′.
First let π be a valid KBP for P . We build a KBP π′ as fol-
lows. We replace each occurrence of an action ai in π with
if Kpi−1 ∨ Kn¯i−1 then api else ani endif . Now for each
nonoccurrence of ai in π, i.e., at each place where ai−1 oc-
curs right before ai+d, d > 1, we insert a “pass” action by in-
serting the KBP if Kpi−1∨Kn¯i−1 then ap¯i else an¯i endif .
It is easily shown by induction on π′ that each time a variant
of action ai is taken, either the value of pi−1 or the value of
ni−1 is indeed known, and validity of π′ follows.
Conversely, let π′ be a valid KBP for P ′. Because of
the mutexes μai , at most one variant of each action ai can
occur along any branch of π′. Moreover, if, say, api occurs
twice along a branch, then the deepest occurrence can be
removed without changing the validity of π′, since there are
only epistemic actions and hence, the state never changes.
Finally, because of the first and second sets of clauses in G′,
starting from the first action in π′ all other actions must
follow in order. Hence a valid KBP π for P can be built by
replacing api or a
n
i with a, ignoring all “pass” actions a
p¯
i , a
n¯
i ,
and finally removing all tests on fresh variables pi, ni, and
μai ’s, keeping the “else” or “then” subprogram arbitrarily.
By construction, the resulting KBP π is valid for P , and the
order of actions in π respects <.
Proposition 19. While-free bounded KBP existence with
a positive epistemic goal is Σp3-hard.
Proof. Let ψ = ∃a1 . . . an∀b1 . . . bp∃c1 . . . cqϕ be an in-
stance of QBF3,∃. Without loss of generality, we assume
n = p (otherwise we add dummy variables). We define an
instance P = (I, AO, AE , G) of while-free bounded KBP ex-
istence by:
• I = K,
• AO = {α+i , α−i | i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {γ+j , γ−j | j = 1, . . . , q},
where:
– α+i (resp. α
−
i ) assigns 1 (resp. 0) to ai and, as a
side effect, nondeterministically reassigns all bj ’s,
– γ+i (resp. γ
−
j ) assigns 1 (resp. 0) to cj ,
• AE = {test(ai ↔ bi) | i = 1, . . . , n},
• G = Kϕ ∧∧pj=1(Kbj ∨Kb¯j),
• k = 2n+ (|ϕ|+ 3)q.
Assume that ψ is a positive instance of qbf3,∃. Then there
exists an assignment a ∈ 2{a1,...,an} and a conditional as-
signment f : 2{b1,...,bp} → 2{c1,...,cq} such that for each
b ∈ 2{b1,...,bp}, abf(b) satisfies ϕ. Let α∗i = α+i if ai is
assigned 1 in a and α∗i = α
−
i if it is assigned 0. Let π be the
following KBP:
α∗1; . . . ;α
∗
n; test(a1 ↔ b1); . . . ; test(an ↔ bn);
if K(ϕ → c1) then γ+1 else γ−1 ;
. . . ;
if K(ϕ → cq) then γ+q else γ−q ;
Clearly, π is a valid plan for P , and its size is 2n+(|ϕ|+3)q.
Conversely, assume I is a negative instance of QBF3,∃,
that is, for every assignment a ∈ 2{a1,...,an} there is an as-
signment g(a) ∈ 2{b1,...,bp} such that for each c ∈ 2{c1,...,cq},
ag(a)c satisfies ¬ϕ. We claim that there is no valid plan
π for P — and a fortiori, no valid plan of size at most
≤ 2n + (|ϕ| + 3)q. Indeed, assume there is a plan π for P .
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First, the only way of knowing the truth value of the bi’s it
to perform test(ai ↔ bi) after an action α+i or α−i . There-
fore, every execution of π must contain at least an action
α+i or α
−
i and further on, test(ai ↔ bi). Moreover, if an-
other action α+j or α
−
j appears later in the execution, after
test(ai ↔ bi) has been performed, then, because all variables
b1, . . . , bp are nondeterministically reassigned, test(ai ↔ bi)
has to be performed again after that. Therefore, each exe-
cution of π must contain, in a first part, at least an action
α+i or α
−
i for every i, then, in a second part, all actions
test(ai ↔ bi) and no action α+i nor α−i (but possibly some
actions γ+i or γ
−
i ).
Now consider an execution e of π, and for i = 1, . . . , n,
let vi(e) = 1 (resp. 0) if the last occurrence of an action
α+i or α
−
i is α
+
i (resp. α
−
i ), and let a(e) ∈ 2{a1,...,an} be
the corresponding assignment. Moreover, consider the point
in the execution e just after the last action α+i or α
−
i has
been performed. After this point, all actions test(ai ↔ bi)
are executed. Consider the particular execution e′ where the
results of these actions are such that the revealed truth value
of the variables b1, . . . , bp constitute exactly the assignment
g(a). The actions γ+i , γ
−
i taken (before or after this point
or after it) result in an assignment c of c1, . . . , cq. Now, by
assumption, ag(a)c does not satisfy ϕ, therefore this partic-
ular execution does not satisfy the goal, contradicting the
validity of π.
Proposition 20. While-free bounded KBP existence re-
stricted to epistemic actions and to positive goals is ΣP2-hard.
Proof. We give a reduction from QBF2,∃. Let ψ =
∃a1 . . . an∀b1 . . . ∃bpϕ be a QBF formula. We build a plan-
ning problem P as follows:
• we use propositional symbols a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bp, c,
d1, . . . , dn,
• AE = {α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn} defined by the feedback
theories
Ωαi = { K(c → ai) ∧ di,K(c → ai) ∧ ¬di,
K(c ∧ ¬ai ∧ di),K(c ∧ ¬ai ∧ ¬di) }
Ωβi = { K(c → ¬ai) ∧ di,K(c → ¬ai) ∧ ¬di,
K(c ∧ ai ∧ di),K(c ∧ ai ∧ ¬di) }
• G = ∧i=1,...,n(Kdi ∨K¬di) ∧ (Kc ∨K(c → ϕ)),
• k = n.
If ψ is valid then let a ∈ 2{a1,...,an} be an assignment which
witnesses this fact. Let π the KBP γ1; . . . ; γn, where γi is
αi if a assigns 1 to ai, and γi is βi if it assigns 0 to it. After
every possible execution of π, either the agent knows c, or
it knows
∧
i(c → a); in the latter case, because ab |= ϕ
for all b, the agent knows c → ϕ, hence in both cases the
second part of the goal is satisfied. Finally, by construction
the agent knows the truth value of each di, and hence π is
a valid plan containing exactly n actions.
Conversely, assume that there is a valid plan of size ≤ n.
Because the agent must learn the truth value of each di, π
must contain αi or βi for each i, and since π is of size n,
it contains exactly one of αi or βi for each i. Now consider
the execution of π in which the sequence of observations
is of the form K(c → a11 ) ∧ dδ11 , . . . ,K(c → ann ) ∧ dδnn .
After this execution, the agent does not know c, therefore,
since π is valid, it knows c → ϕ. This means that ∧i(c →
aii )∧
∧
i d
δi
i entails K(c → ϕ), which entails
∧
i(c → aii ) |=
c → ϕ, which is itself equivalent to ∧i aii |= ϕ and hence,∃a1 . . . an∀b1 . . . ∃bpϕ is a valid instance of QBF2,∃.
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